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This paper provides a survey of the identification of predatory behavior in the bus and airline industries. 
Such behavior may include predatory price cutting, frequency increases, or schedule matching. We consider the 
rule-of-reason approach used by the Office of Fair Trading to investigate allocations in the deregulated Briti.sh 
bus industry, and the alternative Economic Modelling Approach which we have developed. The latter approach 
requires a model of competitive equilibrium to determine whether the actions of the incumbent have converted 
a profitable entry opportunity into a negative one. There have been few formal investigations of predation in the 
airline industry, but the paper reviews the evidence both from the United States and from Europe, and concludes 
that safeguards against such actions are a necessary part of competition policy in the industry. 
1. PREDATION 
This paper is concerned with what might be termed a paradox in the analysis of deregulated transport 
markets. This paradox is that, after barriers to entry have been removed in order to promote competition, firms 
in the industry who respond to competitive entry may find themselves accused of anti-competitive behavior by 
regulatory bodies. While governments have encouraged the breakdown of established regulatory barriers to 
entry, and argued that established and previously-protected firms should be subject to market forces, the "rules 
of the game" seem to outlaw some actions that existing firms might adopt in responding to such market forces. 
Alfred Kahn has coined the phrase "deregulatory schizophrenia" to describe this phenomenon (Kahn, 1987). 
One example of an anti-competitive action is predatory behavior. This paper aims to survey the attitudes 
and responses to predatory actions, both in the deregulated (or liberalized) airline industry and in the deregulated 
UK bus industry. In doing so, we draw on the various published investigations of alleged predatory behavior in 
the UK bus industry since deregulation, and on our own work on the investigation of predatory behavior in the 
airline industry2 and in the bus industry.34 
There are a number of definitions of predatory behavior. Early work on predatory behavior was 
concerned with predatory price cutting, but analysis in the passenger transport industry has indicated that 
predatory behavior may also include predatory increases in capacity and predatory matching of schedules. One 
definition, which we have adopted ourselves, is that: 
Predatory behavior occurs when firms give up some of their maximum current profits after entry into one 
of their markets has occurred, in order to eliminate the new competitor or deter or delay subsequent entry, so that 
greater profits can be earned in the longer run. 
An alternative, and less strict, definition is that predatory behavior only occurs when incumbents actually 
make losses after entry in one of their markets has occurred, in order to eliminate the new competitor or deter 
or delay subsequent entry. In both cases, predatory behavior is consistent with long run profit maximization on 
the part of the predator. 
There is an extensive literature on the question of whether predation can ever be a rational entry-
deterring strategy. We have reviewed this literature elsewhere (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1988), and believe 
that the evidence does support the view that predation can be a rational strategy under certain circumstances. This 
view is confirmed by other recent surveys of predatory behavior.67 
I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council and the Department of Transport for financial assistance for a 
project on the identification of predatory behavior in the bus industry, funded under grant no. WD 0825 0022. This present paper 
draws partly on this project, though I alone am responsible for the views expressed. I am also grateful to my collaborators in 
research on predation, Yannis Katsoulacos, Chris Newton and Richard Pryke, and to Peter Mackie and John Preston of the 
Institute of Transport Studies at the University of Leeds for data and other information used in the Preston case study. 
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2. APPROACHES TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF PREDATION 
There are two main approaches to the identification of predation. One is to use specific rules, or "bright-
lines", to separate cases of predation from cases where predatory behavior is absent. The best-known of these 
is the Areeda-Turner rule8 which prevents firms from pricing below short-run marginal cost, or below its proxy, 
average variable costs. However, all the various "bright-lines" which have been proposed suffer from defects 
which limit their general applicability. The main problem with "bright-lines" is that predation could be taking 
place even if none of these "bright-lines" were being violated. 
The alternative, rule-of-reason, approach involves taking each case on its merits. Generally it is possible 
to determine first whether the market under consideration is one where predation would be a feasible and rational 
strategy, since if it is not then it would not be sensible to investigate further. As indicated in Katsoulacos,9 
predation is likely to be feasible and rational: 
(1) where there are medium barriers to entry, i.e. where barriers are not so great that entry is extremely 
difficult (in which case there will be no need to predate in order to deter entry), and not so low that 
entry is so easy that predation will not have any effect on subsequent entry. 
(2) where the market is highly concentrated, or where competition is "localized" in the sense that any 
entrant will compete directly with only one or a few of the existing firms. In both circumstances 
existing firms would be affected significantly by entry, and so would have an incentive to respond. 
(3) where the incumbent firm operates in a multi-market industry (like airlines or buses), where 
successful predation in one market may deter entry into subsequent markets. 
( 4) where there is an asymmetry of bankruptcy constraints, so that the incumbent can use 
his "long-purse" to finance the profits he forgoes by preying. 
The conventional rule-of-reason approach then considers all other relevant evidence in order to 
determine whether predation has occurred. This is the approach used by the UK Office of Fair Trading in their 
recent investigations in the bus industry. These are reviewed in Section III of this paper. 
In his report on predatory pricing to the European Commission, Phlips argued that predation involves 
the conversion of a profitable entry opportunity into an unprofitable one. Thus, proof of predation should involve 
a rule-of-reason approach in which evidence is provided: 
to the effect that an alleged predatory price cut turned a positive entry value into a negative one 
for the alleged victim. It should be shown that the present value offuture profits is larger than the 
fixed sunk entry costs of the victim under normal competition and that the price cut made this value 
smaller than the fixed sunk entry cost. In simple words, this amounts to showing that without the 
price cut, there was room in the market for an additional firm under normal competition, that is, 
in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. And that, as a result of the price cutting, the price went 
below the noncooperative Nash equilibrium price.10 
If the model reveals Phlips' approach requires a model which predicts the noncooperative Nash (or 
"normal competitive") equilibrium in the market under investigation. We have developed this approach, which 
we refer to as the Economic Modelling Approach (EMA), in a study of predation in the UK bus industry. Some 
results are discussed in Section IV of the present paper. 
If the model predicts that there is no positive entry value, i.e. the equilibrium profits of the entrant Qe• 
are negative.so that there is not room in the market for two firms, then either the entrant has entered by mistake, 
or alternatively the entrant is aware of the potential profitability of the market and is hoping to displace the 
existing incumbent. If, on the other hand, the model predicts that there is. a positive entry value but the entrant 
actually makes losses, i.e. the actual profits of the entrant 6 e are negative, then predation is a possibility. However, 
it is necessary to be careful to distinguish predation from other possibilities that are also consistent with positive 
equilibrium (O; > 0) profits for the entrant. One such possibility is that the entrant chooses the lYIQllll level of 
entry, in terms of prices and/or service level, by mistake. Another is that the entrant deliberately chooses a price/ 
service level combination \Vhich is not its own best response to the incurnbent's combination, in order to influence 
the incumbent's behavior: in the extreme, the entrant might choose a combination which denies the incumbent 
any profitable response. 
3. UK REGULATORY AGENCIES' STUDIES OF PREDATION IN THE BUS INDUSTRY 
Competition policy in the UK is the responsibility of two government agencies, the Office ofFairTrading 
(OFT) and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC)." The OFT is concerned with the issue of whether 
anti-competitive practices exist. If they do, then the practices may be referred to the MMC, whose task is to 
discover whether they act against the public interest. This two-stages procedure naturally increases the timescale 
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of investigations. There are no powers to levy fines, though the government has powers to force offending parties 
to modify their behavior. 
If the OFf believe that a complaint about predatory behavior may be justified, they institute a formal 
enquiry. Four such enquiries into allegations of predation in the deregulated bus industry had been completed 
by the end of 1991.121314 " All involved allegations that large incumbent firms had acted to force smaller or less 
powerful entrants out of the market. 
In the West Yorkshire case a small company, Pinnacle Coaches, alleged that when it started operating 
a service along a part of a route operated by the incumbent, West Yorkshire Road Car Company Ltd, the latter 
immediately responded by cutting its fares - but only on the section of its route where it faced competition - by 
offering return tickets for the price of a single. In the Inverness case the entrant, Inverness Traction Ltd, started 
up a network of minibus services in May 1988 in the town of Inverness. Inverness was already served by Highland 
Scottish Omnibuses Ltd with a network of conventional bus routes. Highland Scottish was part of the nationalized 
Scottish Transport Group. Highland Scottish matched the entrant's lowerfares,16 and increased its own capacity. 
The entrant went into receivership in March 1989, though its operations were taken over by another firm 
(Alexanders). In the South Yorkshire case the incumbent, South Yorkshire Transport, reacted when a small local 
operator (Groves) introduced a service abandoned by SYT, byre-introducing its own buses along the route and 
cutting fares. In the Hl!ll case a small operator, Good News Travels, complained of selective fare cuts and 
aggressive scheduling by the incumbent, Kingston upon Hull City Transport Ltd. 
The OFf defined predatory behavior as involving the deliberate acceptance of losses in the short run with 
the aim of eliminating competition so that enhanced profits could be earned in the longer term. They recognized 
that such behavior could involve not only predatory price cuts, but also excessive frequency levels ("route 
swamping" or "overbussing") or the unjustified matching of competitors' timetables. Successful predators would 
need market power in order to finance their short-term losses and in order to be able to deter further entry once 
competition had ceased. 
The OFf adopted a three-stage rule-of-reason approach, considering in turn: 
(1) The feasibility of predation The OFf judged that the deregulated local bus market was not perfectly 
contestable. In addition, in all four cases the incumbent firms were dominant in their local markets 
and had the ability to cross-subsidize their losses. 
(2) The relationship between revenue and costs The OFf took the view that prices below short-run 
marginal costs or below short-run average variable costs would be sufficient evidence of predation 
(as implied by the Areeda-Turnerrole ), but they would not be necessary. However, in line with their 
view that predatory behavior involves the incumbent actually making losses (rather than simply 
foregoing profits), they regarded absence of losses on the incumbent's routes as sufficient evidence 
to reject allegations of predation. For this reason they did not believe there had been predatory 
behavior in the Hull case. 
(3) Evidence of predatory intent Where incumbents were making losses, but covering variable costs, 
additional evidence on intent would be required. Here the OFT considered the timing of competitive 
moves, the incumbents' actions in markets where they did not face entry, their behavior once the 
entrant had left the market, their behaviorin markets where they faced a powerful competitor, their 
explanations for the reasons for their actions, and any documentary evidence from their business 
plans and formal management objectives. 
The OFf concluded that incumbents' actions had restricted competition and constituted anti-competitive 
practices in Inverness and in South Yorkshire, but not in Hull nor in West Yorkshire, though we believe that the 
West Yorkshire decision partly reflects uncertainty by the Office in the face of incomplete information. In the 
South Yorkshire case, the Director General of Fair Trading could not refer the matter to the MMC because of 
the passage of time since the cessation of the anti-competitive action. However, the incumbent was warned that 
any similar action could be the subject of a further investigation. In the Inverness case, the OFT did refer the 
matter to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
The MMC report on Inverness" was published in July 1990, sixteen months after the start of the OFf's 
initial formal investigation and 22 months after Inverness Traction's initial complaint. By the time the MMC 
reported the two weak initial owners of the entrant (Inverness Traction Ltd, and Alexanders) had both gone into 
liquidation, but the operation had passed into the hands of Magicbus (Scotland} Ltd, a subsidiary of the largest 
British bus operator, Stagecoach. The MMC confirmed the OFr's belief that Highland Scottish had acted anti-
competitively by considerably expanding capacity. They also believed that these predatory practices might have 
been expected to operate against the public interest, since the takeover of Inverness Traction by Alexanders had 
been unlikely and, in the absence of competition, the incumbent would probably have adopted lower service 
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levels and higher fares. The subsequent takeover of Alexanders by Magicbus meant that Highland Scottish had 
not been able to do this. 
As a consequence, the MMC did not propose any remedial or preventative measures in this particular 
case. Instead, the Commission believed its best short-term remedy would be "to make it clear to the bus industry 
that this Commission would normally expect to recommend briskly effective remedial action in any case referred 
to them in which they found the public interest adversely affected by an anti-competitive practice."" While the 
MMC has no powers to impose fines, the Commission also reflected that the possibility of fines (under EC 
competition laws) might have "punitive and deterrent merits". 
The Commission believed that the circumstances in Inverness were exceptional, in that competition 
continued despite the findings that the incumbent had acted anti-competitively. (However, those who believe that 
predatory behavior is irrational may simply conclude that the case study shows that competition was not 
deterred). After the long period of investigation, no direct penalties were imposed on the incumbent, though the 
investigations themselves imposed a cost in terms of management time and the costs of professional advice, while 
the incumbent's management clearly found the experience of being investigated a painful one. We think that they 
were also genuinely puzzled about what was expected of them when they faced a serious challenge in what was 
for them a major market. This challenge was actually made more serious by the fact that the entrant firm lacked 
management experience, and had based its entry strategy on unrealistic expectations. In particular the entrant 
undercut the incumbent's fares, but did not expect the incumbent to react at all. Acting "irrationally" may actually 
be an effective entry strategy, since the incumbent may believe that the entrant will not respond rationally to a 
normal competitive response. 
After the publication of the MMC report on Inverness, an editorial in Bus Business, the influential trade 
publication, concluded: 
.... until the OFf and the MMC care to define just what they mean by "anti-competitive behavior" 
and "the public interest", bus companies will be left in the dark with only natural instinct to guide 
their behavior as attackers or defenders. And, no doubt, they will continue to fall foul of 
Government watchdogs for breaking rules which appear to defy logical expJanation19• 
While this statement ignores the considerable published guidance provided by the OFf on anti· 
competitive behavior, it does illustrate the attitudes of many in the industry faced with the government's apparent 
"deregulatory schizophrenia". 
4. IDENTIFYING PREDATION IN THE BUS INDUSTRY USING OF THE ECONOMIC 
MODELLING APPROACH 
The Economic Modelling Approach described in Section II requires us to be able to identify actual profits 
or losses of protagonists in a predatory behavior investigation, and to identify equilibrium profits or losses. Hence 
we require enough data to measure the actual profits or losses of incumbents and entrants, and to calibrate a model 
to determine equilibria. 
The models we have developed compute Nash-equilibria where two bus companies compete. Since 
operators compete on service quality as well as price, the models determine equilibrium fare and bus-miles, where 
bus-miles are a proxy for service quality in the form of frequency. The models can solve for profit maximizing 
combinations of these variables, but can also allow for firms having non-profit-maximizing objectives (either 
because the firms are genuinely not maximizing profits, or because these objectives are being used to mask 
predatory intent). Firms which are not profit-maximizers can be modelled as maximizing a weighted average of 
profits and patronage, or a weighted average of profits and consumer surplus. Bus operators' costs are modelled 
as linear functions of bus-miles and patronage (either passenger-journeys, or passenger-miles), plus an element 
of fixed costs. 
We have developed two forms of the model, one with constat-elasticity demand functions and one with 
non-constant-elasticity demand functions. Demand for each operators' services is a function of its own fare, its 
rival's fare, its own bus-miles and its rival's bus miles. Ideally one would want to estimate these demand functions 
econometrically for the particular case being studied. So far this has not proved possible because of the need for 
a large enough sample of patronage and other data for each operator, and the need for sufficient variations in the 
fare and bus-miles variables for both firms. However, the form of the demand models used (with only one 
unknown parameter in each firm's demand function once the four relevant elasticities are known) enables us to 
calibrate demand functions from one observation of both firms' patronage, fares and bus-miles and cross-bus-
miles elasticities. These elasticity estimates are derived by simulating patronage responses to fare and service 
changes via a generalized cost-of-travel framework within a Hotelling "spatial" model of competition on the 
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particular bus route being investigated. This approach to simulating elasticities, and the full equilibrium solution 
to the constant elasticity version of the model, are set out in full in Dodgson, Katsoulacos and Newton.20 
We have used the EMA to investigate competition both in Inverness and in another medium-sized British 
town, Preston. In Preston, a municipally-owned operator (Preston Borough Transport) faced entry on most of 
its routes from a private competitor (Zippy) operating high-frequency minibuses. Zippy matched the incumbent's 
fares, and Preston Borough Transport responded by increasing its own frequencies and by replacing many of its 
own high-capacity double-deck vehicles by minibuses. The entrant retained a slight cost advantage even when 
both firms were operating minibuses but was never able to achieve as high load factors as the incumbent. After 
a year of competition, the entrant sold out to Ribble, another bus company operating in the local market. 
We used the EMA to model competition in three of the main corridors in Preston.21 In the first of these 
corridors, both firms initially made losses, but the model showed that there was a profitable entry opportunity. 
As competition proceeded, and the incumbent, Preston Borough Transport, reduced unit costs by replacing 
double-deck vehicles by minibuses, it was able to eliminate its losses. The necessary conditions for predation (Oc 
< 0 and <':>, > 0) were still both satisfied, but we do not believe predation was the cause. In the early days of 
competition the entrant, Zippy, made the mistake of operating too high a level of frequency. These frequency 
levels were later reduced, but analysis of bus-miles reaction functions indicates that in the later days of 
competition the entrant could have further reduced its own bus-miles reaction functions indicates that in the later 
days of competition the entrant could have further reduced its own bus-miles, given the fare/frequency 
combination offered by its rival, and eliminated its own losses. In this sense the incumbent was not denying the 
entrant a profitable entry opportunity, though since both firms were choosing service levels higher than in Nash 
equilibrium, they were both reducing the maximum profits that could be earned by their rival. In this sense the 
situation was akin to Stackelberg warfare, which each firm was seeking to establish market leadership but not to 
eliminate its rival. 
In the other two corridors we modelled in Preston both firms operated minibus services. In neither 
market were the necessary conditions for predation satisfied. In the second corridor, the entrant earned modest 
profits, while the incumbent was much more profitable. The model showed that the Nash equilibrium was of this 
pattern: i.e. in Nash equilibrium the entrant could barely break even, and in practice had actually succeeded in 
doing rather better than predicted by this Nash equilibrium. In the third corridor, the Nash equilibria showed that 
both firms could make money in the market, and indeed in practice both did, though somewhat less than predicted 
by the model. 
In all the runs of the model we used the models to consider the predictions about behavior that would 
result if either firm adopted non-profit-maximizing behavior. This was to see whether actual behavior could be 
explained by the adoption of different objectives to profit maximization. The incumbent's behavior could never 
be explained in these terms but, in the second corridor modelled, the observed outcome (of the entrant doing 
rather better than in Nash equilibrium) could be explained in terms of Zippy, the entrant, providing more output 
than if it were a profit maximizer adjusting to the price and output of its rival. 
Results of our application of the EMA to Inverness are discussed in detail elsewhere.22 The constant-
elasticity version of the model showed that the necessary conditions for predation (0, < 0 and o; > 0) were 
satisfied. Analysis of bus-miles reaction functions showed that both firms were operating higher frequency levels 
than in Nash equilibrium, but that each firm could have eliminated its own loss by reducing its own service level. 
Thus neither firm would have succeeded in eliminating.the other, though the incumbent was by its actions 
reducing the entrant's profits and so may have deterred future entry. However the EMA also shows how the 
entrant was also acting aggressively. This is a factor which we think is relevant in judging the behavior of the 
incumbent. 
S. PREDATORY BEHAVIOR IN AVIATION 
We turn now to consider predatory behavior in aviation. The issue of predatory behavior has not played 
a major role in discussions of barriers to entry in the U.S. aviation industry. Morrison and Winston23 have shown 
that the industry is not perfectly contestable, but discussions of barriers to entry have concentrated on airport 
access, hub-and-spoke systems, frequent flyer programs, computer reservation systems (CRS) and control of 
feeder airlines. 
Nevertheless, Alfred Kahn (the former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board) has indicated that he 
believes predatory action to have been a significant barrier to free competition. He has described two instances24 
where he believed that an incumbent had reacted to entry by undercutting the entrant's lower fares and by 
increasing capacity. In reviewing the unexpected consequences of U.S. deregulation, he has noted that the 
reconcentration of the industry in America reflects "what many of the advocates of deregulation would 
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characterize as a lamentable failure of the (Reagan) administration to enforce the policies of the antitrust laws 
- to disallow a single merger or to press for divestiture of the computerized reservation systems or attack a single 
case of predation"25• Our own investigations of competition in the US airline industry26 revealed a number of 
instances where incumbents' actions appeared to be predatory. These included instances of so-called "discipline 
pricing", where incumbents took predatory action against entrants in markets other than the one where new entry 
had occurred. 
However, US airlines have been reluctant to take legal action against alleged predators. One reason is 
the expense of doing so, combined with the lengthy nature of the process, so that once an action is finally settled 
the alleged example of predation has long since passed. A second reason is the unsympathetic attitude of US 
courts to alleged instances of predation, in part due to the (now-discredited) arguments that predation can never 
be a rational strategy. Legal action is also less likely to succeed in the US because of the attitude of the Department 
of Justice that the yardstick for detecting predation is the Areeda-Turner rule - given the low level of short-run 
marginal costs of carrying passengers once capacity levels are determined, this test is unlikely to be met. 
The third reason why airlines have had a reluctance to take legal action is that smaller airlines often rely 
on the goodwill of larger carriers for co-operation in matters such as maintenance facilities, use of reservation 
systems or through ticketing, and there is an unwillingness to offend them by taking action in the courts. Fourthly, 
many of those who may have been the victims of predation have been new airlines, whose managers have been 
the strongest advocates of free competition and the abolition of regulation: they are therefore reluctant to go 
running to government agencies for protection when they are the victims of fierce (and in our view essentially .a.n1i.: 
competitive) actions by their competitors. Finally, action against predation would be bad for publicity, because 
it would appear that the complainant was asking the courts to increase air fares. 
Instances of alleged predatory behavior in European aviation have not been common, and formal 
investigations rarer still. In part this results from the previous tight regulation of the industry. If incumbent 
airlines are protected by their governments against competition, then entry cannot occur, and so the issue of 
predation does not arise. When markets have been liberalized, some allegations of predation have emerged. 
The UK Civil Aviation Authority has carried out a number of investigations which have touched on the 
issue of predation. They rejected a complaint from the charter carrier, Britannia, that it might be subject to unfair 
competition from British Airways at weekends, when BA used aircraft primarily operated for weekday domestic 
shuttle services. These aircraft could be operated on international flights on a marginal cost basis at weekends, 
but the CAA concluded that this was a legitimate use of BA's spare resources (in effect, a legitimate economy 
of scope).27 A case which involved an a!Iegation of capacity expansion and timetable matching by BA on the 
London to Manchester route did not come to a full hearing, though we believe that the most likely cause of the 
entrant's losses in this case was an unprofitable level of entry (i.e. mistakes on the entrant's part), rather than 
predatory action by the incumbent.2K The CAA considered an application by Loganair to refuse reactivation of 
BA's license to operate the Glasgow to Manchester route. Loganairclaimed that BA would eventually act anti-
competitively if it was allowed to operate on the route. In rejecting Loganair's arguments, the CAA noted: "while 
the potential for anti-competitive behavior may be greatest when airlines of greatly differing sizes and strengths 
compete, to eliminate the risks by eliminating competition is an unattractive baby-with-bathwater type remedy". 2') 
Predatory behavior was also alleged when UK - Ireland air routes were the subject of bilateral 
liberalization. Liberalization in 1986 led to entry, to substantial increases in capacity and fa!Is in real fare levels, 
and to a two-and-a-half-fold increase in traffic.311 However, the incumbent Irish carrier, Air Lingus, reacted 
strongly to entry by the new Irish airline Ryanair on some routes. Eventually, in September 1989, the Irish 
government preserved its two-airline policy by preventing head-to-head route competition by the two Irish 
carriers.31 
Elsewhere, European airlines have been protected from competition by their governments. Before it was 
taken over by Air France at the beginning of 1990, the Il]?in problem faced by the independent French 
international carrier UTA was in securing routes from the French government. When UTA was given some 
limited additional traffic rights in 1986, between Paris and San Francisco, Air France was also authorized to fly 
on this route, as well as on UT A's existing route between Papeete (Tahiti) and San Francisco. When UT A started 
their weekly direct service between Nantes and New York in October 1989, Air France offered passengers from 
Nantes a free connecting ticket to Paris if they flew to New York with Air France. Both types of response to entry 
may be consistent with a foregoing of short-run profits on the part of the incumbent airline. 
Predatory pricing in aviation appears to be more difficult to identify thari in the bus industry because of 
the prevalence of price discrimination. This has been growing with deregulation and liberalization, and with the 
development of sophisticated yield management systems linked to CRS's.32 The problem is to distinguish 
between "those deeply discounted fares, confined in principle to filling seats that would otherwise go empty, with 
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highly demand-elastic passengers, (which) look like the clearest examples of price discrimination that contributes 
unequivocally to economic efficiency,"33 from "deep, pinpointed, discriminatory price cuts by big companies 
aimed at driving price cutters out of the market, in order then to be able to raise prices back to their previous 
levels."34 We believe that the crucial issue in identifying predation, that is in distinguishing the latter case from 
the former, is in discovering if incumbent firms are deliberately foregoing revenue and hence profits in pricing 
their capacity. However, such proof is likely to be difficult without detailed access to yield management systems 
and CRS's. 
We conclude on aviation that the nature of the industry is such that predation can be both a feasible and 
a rational strategy (see also OECD, 1988, pp. 77-78). In a deregulated or liberalized market, entry barriers are 
neither so low as to make entry-deterrence pointless, nor so high as to make it unnecessary. Firms operate in a 
number of markets (i.e. different routes), so that action in one market might deter entry elsewhere on the 
incumbent's network. There will be a small number of firms competing on any single route, so that successful entry 
will significantly affect the entrant's profits, and so would be worth preventing. Finally, existing (usually large) 
incumbents will often have a "longer purse" than potential entrants, and may, if government-owned, have a less 
binding bankruptcy constraint than would a private-sector competitor. 
Signs that predation mig!U be taking place include: 
(i) significant fare cuts by an incumbent when entry occurs, especially if the entrant's 
fares are undercut 
(ii) capacity increases by the incumbent once entry has occurred or is threatened 
(iii) "timetable matching" by the incumbent 
(iv) operation of services by the incumbent at a loss, without proper steps being taken to 
eliminate such losses, when entry occurs or is threatened 
(v) retaliatory action of any of the above types on other routes where the incumbent and 
entrant are already in competition. 
The crucial issue for predation is whether, in undertaking such actions, the incumbent is foregoing some 
of its own profits so that a profitable entry opportunity for the entrant is converted into an unprofitable one. Proof 
of predation therefore requires demonstration that a profitable entry opportunity does exist on the route where 
predation is suspected, and that the entrant has not itself made mistakes which prevent it from exploiting this 
opportunity. Use of the Economic Modelling Approach to demonstrate the former is likely to prove more 
difficult in the airline industry than in the bus industry, because of the difficulty of modelling the range of prices 
offered by airlines for seats on a particular route, so a more conventional rule-of-reason approach is likely to be 
employed. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought in particular to survey instances of alleged predatory behavior in the passenger 
transport industry, and attempts to investigate such instances. One conclusion must be that investigation is 
difficult, and requires detailed data on the patronage, revenue, costs and cost structures of both the incumbent 
and entrant firm. In addition, the investigation needs to consider the question of what alternative outcomes were 
possible in the market under consideration: in particular, was there a profitable entry opportunity, and did actions 
by the incumbent convert it into an unprofitable one for the entran.t? An important issue in relation to the second 
of these questions is that of whether the incumbent by its actions gave up some of the profits it could have earned 
itself in the competitive situation. The Economic Modelling Approach can answer these questions, but the 
modelling and data requirements of the approach are considerable. 
Investigations also need to be reasonably speedy, otherwise they will not be completed before successful 
predation has occurred. In addition, individual victims will have little incentive to complain if the investigations 
will not actually protect them (especially if they receive no compensation if predation is proven ~ their 
demise). Of course, regulatory agencies also need to be wary of unsuccessful entrants who plead predation as a 
source of self-inflicted woes. In contrast, those accused of predation have an incentive to affect puzzlement with 
the predatory behavior concept (see above, Section III). However, the concept is. difficult to understand, almost 
counter-intuitive in a framework where governments are exhorting firms to "let the market work", so that 
protestations cannot necessarily be dismissed as just a protective response. 
Nevertheless, despite the great difficulties in securing an effective policy in regard to predatory behavior, 
we believe that the evidence in airline and bus markets does justify the careful continuation of a policy to deal with 
predatory actions by established firms in the industries. 
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